Whenever a destabilizing event unfolds in the West, foreign-policy discussions inevitably default to a familiar, almost reflexive question: Will Xi Jinping use this moment of distraction as an opportunity to cross the Taiwan Strait and invade his country’s island neighbor? The recent political turbulence following the US midterm elections—which saw Donald Trump’s Republican Party humbled at the polls—serves as the latest canvas for this rote analytical formula. Endlessly linking the daily domestic political theatre of Washington to the long-term strategic calculations of Beijing reveals far more about American hubris than it does about any genuine understanding of how modern China operates. This unhelpful, hyperbolic conjecture has to stop.
No one outside Zhongnanhai, the heavily guarded leadership compound in the heart of Beijing, truly knows what Xi Jinping is thinking at any given moment. For outside observers, the best that can be achieved is educated estimation. It is safe to assume, however, that the Chinese president was not hosting a late-night US election watch party, eagerly awaiting the final results so he could immediately summon his generals and dust off the latest amphibious invasion plans. There is no denying that Beijing views Taiwan as a historic province that must eventually be brought back into the fold, nor that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would almost certainly resort to force if severely provoked. Yet, to assume that Xi is an opportunistic gambler waiting for a distracted American president is to fundamentally misunderstand his methodical nature.
The Chinese president will consistently try to avoid a destructive war against a population that Beijing views as part of the greater national family, pursuing a military option only when absolute success is guaranteed. Even then, looking past ancient maxims such as Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, military success does not merely mean an initial victory on a battlefield. History offers sobering reminders of the vast chasm between capturing territory and securing a lasting political outcome, most notably demonstrated by George W. Bush’s infamous 2003 "Mission Accomplished" speech—delivered mere weeks after the US-led coalition invaded Iraq, and more than two decades before the final American troops quietly withdrew from the quagmire.
Beijing firmly believes that time is on its side, and Zhongnanhai possesses a degree of strategic patience that routinely eludes the White House and Western electoral cycles. Historical accounts record that Mao Zedong informed former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the 1970s that China could afford to wait 100 years to resolve the Taiwan question. Consequently, the Chinese Communist Party’s theoretical countdown clock does not reach zero until 2049, the target year for completing its grand "Chinese Dream" of national rejuvenation.
While the ideal scenario for Beijing would be for Taiwan to willingly opt for peaceful reunification, this aspiration grows increasingly fanciful with each passing generation raised under separate political systems. An eventual end to the island’s de facto independence is therefore more likely to materialize only when Taipei has exhausted alternative futures—either because Washington’s security guarantees ultimately falter or because the conventional power of the PLA becomes so overwhelmingly superior to that of the United States military that resistance is rendered mathematically futile.
Ultimately, Xi’s true legacy project is to cement the long-term institutional rule of the Chinese Communist Party within China itself, rather than to launch a catastrophic military campaign to capture Taiwan. Achieving this domestic permanence requires restoring the nation to what the party perceives as its rightful historical place as the wealthiest, strongest, and most respected country in the region. At the same time, Beijing must successfully navigate pressing internal obstacles, ranging from a stubborn and protracted property and housing crisis to persistent levels of youth unemployment. For all the anxious Western rhetoric regarding China becoming increasingly "assertive" and "belligerent" across the Taiwan Strait, only its military techniques, cyber capabilities, and hardware are genuinely new. The country’s underlying mission and behavioral patterns are best understood as the logical continuation of a decades-long national project aimed at healing historical wounds and restoring national pride.
The fundamental analytical trap that Western policymakers and media outlets continually fall into is judging China through the distorting lens of American standards rather than evaluating Beijing by its own distinct track record and trajectory. Thirteen years into Xi’s presidency, China’s global standing remains remarkably robust, and Beijing is steadily winning ground across multiple strategic fronts, including cutting-edge technology, advanced defense manufacturing, and the export of soft power through popular brands, digital platforms, and cultural entertainment.
While a tattered United States frequently projects internal polarization, exports hostility, and rattles global economic stability, the Chinese state is effectively winning hearts and minds across vast swathes of Asia and the countries of the Global Majority. Providing Beijing avoids catastrophic miscalculations that could destabilize the broader Asian region, its international reputation and geopolitical influence are poised to continue their upward trajectory.
Observers must remember that while major global superpowers inevitably throw their weight around, they do not all operate from the same playbook or share identical strategic objectives. The western habit of inventing glib acronyms—such as grouping China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea together—is intellectually lazy and serves primarily to mask the West’s profound inability to honestly reckon with its own aggressive foreign policy footprint over recent decades.
When measured by the unprovoked invasion of other sovereign nations in the twenty-first century, the United States and Russia stand alone among major global powers, yet no catchy journalistic acronym circulates to categorize that particular duo. Looking strictly at geopolitical volatility and historical precedent, the prospect of American military intervention closer to home remains far more tangible than the immediate descent of PLA soldiers onto the streets of Taipei.
